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INTRODUCTION
Precommitments are most essential when we feel most compelled to break
them. Constitutional law, our collective pact of precommitments, is never more
important than in periods of crisis. History suggests that when democracies are
captured by fear, they react in predictably troubling ways, in particular by
targeting the most vulnerable for selective sacrifices that the majority would
not likely be willing to endure if the sacrifices were evenly distributed. The
Constitution is predicated on the paradoxical understanding that democracy’s
defects can be offset by compelling the majority to adhere to certain norms
precisely when the democratic process would categorically reject them.

* Professor, Georgetown University Law Center. This review expands upon an earlier
review that appeared in the New York Review of Books. David Cole, How to Skip the
Constitution, 53 N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Nov. 16, 2006, at 20.
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If it is to function as a restraint on the politics of fear, the Constitution must
be interpreted not only with an eye toward its purpose and history, but with an
understanding of the profound pressures that are likely to be at play when a
polity in fear demands action. Otherwise, the forces that favor repression within
the ordinary political channels will infect constitutional law as well. Holding
the line during security crises is no simple matter. One need only think of the
Supreme Court’s shameful ratification of the internment of 120,000 Americans
and immigrants of Japanese descent during World War II, or its validation of
prosecutions for anti-war speech during World War I. Political repression
during times of crisis is nearly always deeply regretted as a mistake after the
fact. If we are to learn from such mistakes, constitutional law is the place to
locate and instantiate those lessons, in the hope that the country will exercise
restraint the next time around.
Richard Posner’s Not a Suicide Pact: The Constitution in a Time of
National Emergency reflects none of this understanding. Instead, Posner treats
the Constitution as little more than an invitation to pragmatic policy judgment,
and then employs that judgment through speculative cost-benefit balancing to
find unobjectionable most everything the Bush Administration has done thus
far in the “war on terror,” including coercive interrogation, incommunicado
detention, warrantless wiretapping, and ethnic profiling. One of the only
initiatives he identifies as constitutionally problematic is the Administration’s
short-lived attempt to deny judicial review to U.S. citizens detained in military
custody in the United States as “enemy combatants”—a position the
Administration itself abandoned after the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit, probably the most conservative federal circuit in the country, rejected it
as a “sweeping proposition.”1 Indeed, Posner’s Constitution would permit the
Administration to go much further than it has—among other things, he defends
indefinite preventive detention, banning Islamic extremist rhetoric, mass
wiretapping of the entire nation, and making it a crime for newspapers to
publish classified information, such as when the Washington Post broke the
story on the CIA’s secret prisons, or “black sites,” or when the New York Times
disclosed the existence of the National Security Agency’s (NSA) warrantless
wiretapping program. All of this is permissible, Posner argues, because unless
the Constitution “bend[s]” in the face of threats to our national security, it “will
break” (p. 1). When Posner is finished bending the Constitution to these
conclusions, however, one might justifiably ask what is left to preserve from
“breaking.”
Ironically, Posner reaches these results with a constitutional theory more in
keeping with Chief Justice Earl Warren than Justice Antonin Scalia. Eschewing
popular conservative attacks on “judicial activism,” Posner argues that given
the open-ended character of many of the Constitution’s most important terms—
“unreasonable” searches and seizures, “due process of law,” “equal protection,”
1. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 296 F.3d 278, 283 (4th Cir. 2002).
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and even “liberty” itself—it is not objectionable, but inevitable, that
constitutional law is judge-made. He dismisses the constitutional theories of
textualism and originalism favored by many conservative judges and scholars
as canards, for in his view neither the Constitution’s text nor the history of its
framing and adoption are very informative on most of the hard questions of the
day. Constitutional law, he insists, “is intended to be a loose garment; if it binds
too tightly, it will not be adaptable to changing circumstances and will leave
too little room for the play of democratic forces” (pp. 7-8).
But having rejected textualism and originalism, Posner proceeds
unwittingly to offer a book-length demonstration of what textualists and
originalists most fear from constitutional theorists who emphasize the
document’s open-ended and evolving character. In Posner’s approach, the
Constitution loses almost any sense of a binding precommitment, and is
reduced to a cover for judges to impose their own subjective value judgments
on others. Posner is best known as one of the founding fathers of the law and
economics movement, so it is hardly surprising that his judgments are
powerfully informed by an economist’s fetish for cost-benefit analysis. (One
might almost say determined, except that, as we will see, the valuation of costs
and benefits in this area is almost entirely indeterminate.) In the end,
constitutional interpretation for Posner is little more than an all-thingsconsidered balancing act—and when the potential costs of a catastrophic
terrorist attack are placed on the scale, the concerns of constitutional rights and
civil liberties are almost inevitably outweighed. The further one reads in the
book, the further the Constitution fades into the background, supplanted by
Posner’s ad hoc and often unsupported speculation about the putative costs and
benefits of various security initiatives.
This Review will first discuss Posner’s analysis of several specific
security-liberty issues, in order to illustrate how his “econ-stitutional” method
works in concrete scenarios. I will then turn to the broader implications his
theory has for constitutional law, which in my view are quite dangerous. In his
hands, the Constitution’s “loose garment” appears to do no “binding” work
whatsoever, and its only function is to obscure the subjective value judgments
made in its name.
I. CASE STUDIES
A. Electronic Surveillance
Shortly after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, President Bush
authorized the NSA to conduct wiretapping of telephonic communications
between al Qaeda suspects abroad and persons within the United States. Such
surveillance would not have been controversial had the program proceeded
under the auspices of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), which
expressly authorizes national security and foreign intelligence wiretapping of

1738

STANFORD LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 59:1735

“foreign agents,” including members of international terrorist organizations, as
long as the wiretapping is approved by a federal judge.2 But President Bush
decided to bypass the judicial review required by FISA, and instead authorized
the NSA to conduct the surveillance without warrants, in contravention of a
provision in FISA that makes such warrantless surveillance a criminal offense.3
In 2006, a federal court declared the NSA program unconstitutional, and in
January 2007, Attorney General Alberto Gonzalez announced that the NSA
program would be terminated, and that any future surveillance would be carried
out pursuant to, rather than in contravention of, FISA.4
Posner not only has no problem with the NSA program, but would deem
constitutional a far more sweeping initiative that subjected every phone call
and email in the nation, domestic as well as international, to initial computer
screening for patterns of suspicious words, and then to human agents’ review in
order to follow up on all communications that the computer deemed suspicious
(pp. 95-101).
How does Posner reach the conclusion that the Constitution would permit
such a scheme, far beyond anything the Bush administration has instituted—or
at least admitted instituting? In a word, balancing. In Posner’s view, the costs
of such a program are minimal. Subjecting all of the polity’s phone
conversations to computer analysis is no big deal, he asserts, as long as the
computer is looking only for terrorists, and not for other embarrassing or
private information (p. 97). Posner admits that the human beings who follow up
on the computer’s “suspects” might abuse the information, but considers that
risk minimal because he is confident that any such abuse would be likely to
come to light and to be widely criticized (he fails to note that disclosure would
be much less likely if he had his way and an Official Secrets Act were passed,
making it a crime to publish leaked government secrets) (pp. 97-98). On the
benefits side of the ledger, Posner surmises that such a program might sweep
up all kinds of data that could permit intelligence agents to “connect the dots”
and prevent a catastrophic attack. Even if the program did not actually succeed
in “connecting the dots,” he adds, its mere existence would have the salutary
effect of chilling terrorists from communicating by telephone and email (pp.
95-96).
Every aspect of Posner’s balancing analysis is open to serious question. He
undervalues privacy, which is essential to political freedom: if everyone knows
that their every electronic communication is subject to government monitoring,
even by a computer, it would likely have a substantial chilling effect not only
on terrorist communications, but also on any communications that the
2. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801, 1804, 1805
(2007).
3. 50 U.S.C. § 1809(a) (2007).
4. ACLU v. NSA, 438 F. Supp. 2d 754 (E.D. Mich. 2006); Letter from Alberto R.
Gonzales, U.S. Attorney General, to Senator Patrick Leahy (Jan. 7, 2007), available at
http://www.cdt.org/security/20060117agletter.pdf.
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government might find objectionable. Moreover, given the many ways in which
the government can harass individuals without its ill intent ever coming to
light—from selective prosecution of minor infractions to tax investigations and
blackmail, all perfected by FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover—one cannot trust
public scrutiny to forestall such tactics, even without an Official Secrets Act.
(Most of Hoover’s abuses were not disclosed until years or decades after the
damage was done.)
Finally, it is far from clear that such a program would be an effective
counterterrorism measure. The sheer volume of “dots” generated would make
connecting them virtually impossible. There is not likely to be an algorithm that
can identify terrorist activity, for unlike credit card theft, terrorist activity is not
sufficiently routine to develop useful indicators.5 And given the rich
possibilities of language, computer programs would likely be relatively easy to
evade through the use of code words.
But the real answer to Posner’s approach is not to strike an alternative ad
hoc balance, but to return to long-established Fourth Amendment principles.
The Fourth Amendment requires that all searches be “reasonable,” and has long
been interpreted to require that searches must generally be justified on a
particularized basis, by a showing of objective, individualized suspicion
approved by a neutral judge through the issuance of a specific warrant.6 The
warrant and “probable cause” requirements are designed to protect privacy
absent fairly specific objective grounds for interference—reason to believe that
evidence of crime will be found. The requirements of specificity and
particularity reflect the fact that the principal evil that the Fourth Amendment
was intended to avert was the “general warrant,” which permitted government
officials to search any and every home.7 Posner’s nationwide computer
surveillance program would be a twenty-first century version of exactly what
the Fourth Amendment was designed to forbid. Through an open-ended and
inevitably subjective balancing of privacy and security, in other words, Posner
manages to turn the Fourth Amendment on its head.
B. Coercive Interrogation
Posner’s analysis of coercive interrogation is similarly flawed. Here, he
asserts that the prohibition of coerced confessions is predicated on the Fifth
Amendment privilege against compelled self-incrimination, and reasons
correctly that that privilege would not apply if coerced testimony is used only
for intelligence purposes, and not to incriminate. But while Miranda v.
5. JEFFREY ROSEN, THE NAKED CROWD: RECLAIMING SECURITY AND FREEDOM IN AN
ANXIOUS AGE 104-08 (2004); see also Craig Whitlock, Terrorists Proving Harder to Profile;
European Officials Say Traits of Suspected Islamic Extremists Are Constantly Shifting,
WASH. POST, Mar. 12, 2007, at A1.
6. See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967).
7. TELFORD TAYLOR, TWO STUDIES IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 23-50 (1969).
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Arizona8 rests on the privilege against self-incrimination, Posner disregards a
long line of Supreme Court decisions banning “involuntary” confessions not on
self-incrimination grounds, but because the methods of interrogation
themselves were found to violate due process of law.9 Under this due process
“voluntariness” test, which predates Miranda but remains good law, the Court
has consistently ruled that any tactics that compelled the suspect to speak
against his will, including any physical harm or threat of physical harm,
violated due process, even where other evidence showed that the confession
was reliable.10
Posner ignores this line of cases, and instead discusses only Rochin v.
United States,11 which held that due process was violated by pumping a
suspect’s stomach in the hospital to search for drugs that he had allegedly
swallowed. The Court found that such tactics “shock the conscience,” because
they were “too close to the rack and screw.”12 As Posner concedes, if stomachpumping in a hospital violates due process because it is too close to the rack
and screw, most coercive interrogation tactics would seem to be impermissible
as well. But he nonetheless finds Rochin distinguishable, noting that it
constituted a search, not an interrogation, that the information was used to
incriminate, and that the case involved the investigation of drug smuggling, a
relatively minor crime. He argues that greater coercion may be permissible
where terrorism is the subject of investigation. In his balance, the greater the
value of the information sought, the more coercion we should find acceptable
without shocking our consciences (p. 80). But one generally does not know the
value of any information that might be obtained before coercion is applied.
This is especially true where interrogation is being conducted for intelligence
gathering purposes, where the inquiry is generally much more open-ended than
investigation of a completed crime.
On the matter of interrogation, there is some limit to Posner’s balancing.
He would draw a bright line at torture, at least as a formal legal matter, though
he forgoes any attempt to explain why he is willing to draw the line there and
not at lesser forms of coercion. Moreover, he quickly takes away with one hand
what he has given with the other, arguing that “[i]n the present context, this is a
compelling argument for defining torture extremely narrowly, so that necessary
violations of the law against torture do not become routine” (p. 87). That is
exactly what John Yoo and Jay Bybee did for Alberto Gonzales in the now
infamous August 2002 Office of Legal Counsel “torture memo.”13 Yoo and
8. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
9. Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 540-41 (1961); Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S.
143, 152-53 (1944); Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 285 (1936).
10. See, e.g., Rogers, 365 U.S. at 540-41.
11. 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
12. Id. at 172.
13. Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, U.S. Assistant Attorney Gen., Office of Legal
Counsel, to Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President, Re: Standards of Conduct for
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Bybee defined the criminal ban on torture extremely narrowly, freeing the CIA
to use harsh interrogation tactics on terror suspects. They opined that the ban on
torture did not, for example, proscribe threatening suspects with death, as long
as the death threatened was not imminent, and did not bar the imposition of
extreme physical pain, as long as the pain fell short of the level associated with
organ failure or death. The Administration was forced to rescind the memo
when it became public and was widely condemned.14 But Posner’s approach
might well yield the same results given his emphasis on the need to “define
torture extremely narrowly” (p. 87).
In other recent work, Posner has explained why a balancing approach to
coercive interrogation is dangerous. Posner opposes judicial authorization of
torture even where the need is extremely grave—the classic example being the
need to find a “ticking time bomb”—on the ground that officials would soon
press the outer bounds of the permission, “and the practice of torture, once it
was thus regularized by judicial demarcation of those bounds, would be likely
to become regular within them, ceasing to be an exceptional practice and
setting the stage for further extension.”15 It is a short ride down the slippery
slope:
One begins with the extreme case—the terrorist with plague germs or an
A-bomb the size of an orange in his Dopp kit, or the kidnapper who alone can
save his victim’s life by revealing the victim’s location. So far so good; but
then the following reflections are invited: if torture is legally justifiable when
the lives of thousands are threatened, what about when the lives of hundreds
are threatened, or tens. And the kidnap victim is only one. By such a chain of
reflections one might be persuaded to endorse a rule that torture is justified if,
all things considered, the benefits, which will often be tangible (lives, or a life,
saved), exceed the costs, which will often be nebulous.16

What is true of torture is equally true of physical coercion short of torture.
Posner’s advocacy of a balancing approach, allowing officials to calibrate their
coercion to the expected value of the information sought, would create the very
risks he warned of in his earlier work.
The Constitution ought not be read to leave government officials to balance
in some ad hoc fashion the value of the information they hope to obtain from
suspects against the harms their tactics may inflict—on the individual, on
themselves, and on society at large. Rather, due process has long been
understood to identify certain fundamental rights as integral to civilized
society. One of those is the prohibition on torture and cruel, inhuman, and
Interrogations under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A (Aug. 1, 2002), available at 2002 OLC
LEXIS 19.
14. See Memorandum from Daniel Levin, U.S. Acting Assistant Attorney Gen., Office
of Legal Counsel, to James B. Comey, U.S. Deputy Attorney Gen., Re: Legal Standards
Applicable Under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A (Dec. 30, 2004), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/olc/18usc23402340a2.htm.
15. RICHARD A. POSNER, CATASTROPHE: RISK AND RESPONSE 240 (2004).
16. Id. at 240-41.

1742

STANFORD LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 59:1735

degrading treatment—a principle reflected in an international treaty that
virtually every nation in the world has ratified, and in the Court’s own decades
of due process jurisprudence prohibiting coercive interrogation in criminal
investigations.
C. Preventive Detention
Posner employs similar economic reasoning to defend the constitutionality
of incommunicado preventive detention—without judicial oversight—for a
“reasonable” period of time, but when it comes to defining what is reasonable
he offers an economist’s graph: “The benefits [of incommunicado detention]
diminish with time and the costs increase with time; when the curves cross, the
detainee should be brought before a judicial officer for a determination of
whether further detention is necessary” (p. 64). But how is one to know “when
the curves cross”? One would first have to somehow quantify the “benefits” of
incommunicado detention, which Posner defines as avoiding tipping off
accomplices, increasing the likelihood of “turning” the suspect into an
informant, and “facilitat[ing] forms of coercive interrogation that do not quite
[constitute torture]” (p. 63). The costs would then also need to be quantified,
including the deprivation of liberty of a presumptively innocent (and indeed,
not even charged) person, the terrorizing effects of a system of such official
“disappearances” on the community at large, and the likelihood that such
practices would breed substantial distrust and resentment within the community
targeted by such tactics, the very communities whose trust law enforcement
needs in order to encourage voluntary cooperation. Posner concedes that this
balancing exercise is literally impossible: “Assessing the relevant needs and
dangers requires a weighing of imponderables . . . . To weigh the unweighable
is at once a contradiction and an inescapable duty” (p. 66). But if it is an
impossible task, how is the equation workable? And why should we entrust this
task to law enforcement officials, who will have strong institutional incentives
to favor security interests over liberty and who by definition would be making
these judgment calls without independent judicial oversight?
Posner insists that once the curves cross, any continued detention without
judicial oversight would constitute a suspension of the writ of habeas corpus,
and at that point the suspect would have to be brought before a judge. But
Posner’s version of habeas corpus is nearly an empty formality: he says it
requires “a judicial determination that the government had a justification for
detaining [a terrorist suspect],” but immediately qualifies that by noting that
“what might count as a justification is no part of habeas corpus” (pp. 60-61).
Having robbed habeas corpus of any meaning, he then fails to specify what
standard the government would have to meet to justify detention. However, he
suggests that the burden could be placed on the defendant to prove that he is
not a terrorist, and that the government could rely on secret evidence presented
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to the judge ex parte and in camera, thereby denying the detainee any
meaningful opportunity to defend himself (pp. 64-65).
At the end of his “balancing” exercise, Posner has concluded that persons
suspected of terrorism can be swept off the streets in secret, held
incommunicado without any judicial oversight for an unspecified “reasonable”
period of time, and held indefinitely thereafter on the basis of secret evidence
and without charges as long as there is an undefined “persuasive showing to a
judge in an adversary hearing that the suspect really is a terrorist” (pp. 65-66).
What does it mean to say that someone “really is a terrorist” who cannot be
criminally charged with any terrorist crimes? Posner never says. If due process
forbids the deportation of a foreign national without affording him a
meaningful opportunity before a neutral tribunal to confront the evidence
against him,17 how can it be permissible to hold suspects indefinitely on secret
evidence and without charges? If the Constitution requires that anyone arrested
without advance judicial approval be brought before a judge for a probable
cause hearing as soon as possible after being taken into custody, and
presumptively within forty-eight hours,18 why should the government be
permitted to hold “suspected terrorists” incommunicado for longer periods of
time? Beyond an assertion that the balance is to be struck differently with
respect to the undefined category of “suspected terrorists,” these questions go
unanswered.
Posner also pays little attention to the history of preventive detention.
During the Palmer Raids of 1919-1920, sparked by a series of terrorist
bombings, thousands of foreign nationals were rounded up, detained, and
interrogated without lawyers, and hundreds were ultimately deported—but
none was charged with involvement in the bombings.19 During World War II,
not one of the 120,000 Americans and immigrants of Japanese descent interned
was convicted of sabotage.20 And of the more than 5000 foreign nationals that
the government has admitted to placing in preventive detention in the first two
years after September 11, none has been convicted of a terrorist crime.21 Again,
this history seems of little interest to Posner, who prefers to do his own ad hoc
balancing.
D. Ethnic Profiling
Efficiency concerns also dominate Posner’s analysis of ethnic profiling. He
correctly observes that whether profiling a suspect group will actually make us
17. Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 26 (1982).
18. County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 60 (1991); Gerstein v. Pugh, 420
U.S. 103, 125 (1975).
19. DAVID COLE, ENEMY ALIENS: DOUBLE STANDARDS AND CONSTITUTIONAL
FREEDOMS IN THE WAR ON TERRORISM 116-28 (rev. ed. 2005).
20. Id. at 88-100.
21. Id. at xx, 25-26.
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safer depends in part on so-called “substitution effects”: to what extent will
paying closer attention to Arab and Muslim men, for example, make it easier
for people who do not fit that profile to elude detection, and how likely is it that
terrorists will find willing recruits among the non-profiled group?22 But after
raising these questions, Posner simply asserts, without an iota of empirical
support, that “[t]he balance is close enough to warrant leaving the matter to be
governed by policy rather than prohibited as a matter of constitutional law”
(p. 119). In others words, because he has somehow concluded that the
substitution effects are a close call, ethnic profiling is constitutional. On this
reasoning, there would be no equal protection problem if the United States
officially subjected all persons of Arab descent to intrusive searches that no one
else had to suffer. We have seen such reasoning before: Korematsu v. United
States.23 But few defend it today.
Equal protection doctrine, which Posner barely mentions, would almost
certainly require a very different analysis. Any official consideration of
ethnicity or race triggers strict scrutiny, as the Court’s recent decisions on
affirmative action reaffirmed.24 Strict scrutiny is required because of the
history of invidious reliance on race and ethnicity, and the judgment that racial
generalizations will rarely if ever be justified in light of the stigmatic harms
they inflict and their offense to notions of individualized justice. Unless the
state can show that a race- or ethnicity-based distinction is necessary, or
narrowly tailored, to further a compelling government interest, it fails strict
scrutiny.25 Under this analysis, preventing terrorism would surely be deemed a
compelling government interest, but ethnic profiling would be permissible only
if it were necessary to further that interest. Where alternatives not based on race
or ethnicity exist, the government is barred from using those criteria as a proxy.
Using race as an identifying feature to narrow the scope of a search for suspects
in connection with a specific crime is permissible where an eyewitness has
identified the perpetrator by race, but reliance on racial generalizations about
who is “more likely” to commit certain kinds of crimes is not.
Constitutional law, in other words, does not leave the question of ethnic
profiling to the political process, precisely because the political process has
historically done such a poor job of ensuring equity for members of racial
minority groups. But that history and that doctrine are nowhere to be found in
Posner’s account; he prefers to resolve the question by the ad hoc weighing of

22. For a more elaborate development of this point, see Bernard E. Harcourt, Muslim
Profiles Post-9/11: Is Racial Profiling an Effective Counterterrorist Measure and Does It
Violate the Right to Be Free from Discrimination? (Univ. of Chi. John M. Olin Law & Econ.
Working Paper No. 288, 2006), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=893905.
23. 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
24. See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326 (2003).
25. Id.; Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 980 (1996); Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena,
515 U.S. 200, 230 (1995).
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imponderables, and ultimately to leave minority rights, at least on this issue, to
a political process that is exceedingly unlikely to provide any protection.26
II. THE DISAPPEARING CONSTITUTION
The general problem with Posner’s approach is that it does away with the
animating idea of the Constitution—namely, that it is a form of collective
precommitment. The genius behind the Constitution is precisely the recognition
that “pragmatic” cost-benefit decisions of the type Posner favors will often
appear in the short term to favor actions that in the long term are contrary to our
own best principles. Just as we may be tempted to smoke a cigarette tonight

26. While Posner generally prefers his own cost-benefit judgments to constitutional
precedent, at other points, he simply announces constitutional conclusions without any
attempt to defend them through cost-benefit (or indeed any other) analysis. For example, he
asserts that the Constitution protects citizens within the United States and abroad, and
foreign nationals within the United States, but not foreign nationals abroad. This is a roughly
accurate summary of Supreme Court holdings and dicta on the subject, although the Court
has not in fact resolved whether foreign nationals enjoy constitutional protections abroad. It
has held that foreign nationals at the border seeking the privilege of admission are not
entitled to due process when denied entry, Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345
U.S. 206 (1953), but that holding is fully consistent with precedents holding that U.S.
citizens are not entitled to due process when merely denied a privilege. Olim v. Wakinekona,
461 U.S. 238, 248-49 (1983). See generally GERALD L. NEUMAN, STRANGERS TO THE
CONSTITUTION: IMMIGRANTS, BORDERS, AND FUNDAMENTAL LAW (1996); David Cole, In Aid
of Removal: Due Process Limits on Immigration Detention, 51 EMORY L.J. 1003 (2002). It
has ruled that the Fourth Amendment does not govern the search of a foreign national’s
home abroad, United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259 (1989), but Justice Kennedy
cast the decisive vote in that case, and he rejected the notion that foreign nationals simply are
not protected by any aspect of the Constitution abroad, preferring instead to take a right-byright approach, asking whether application of the right would be “anomalous.” Id. at 277-78
(Kennedy, J., concurring). And while the Court held that the Fifth and Sixth Amendments do
not protect prisoners of war captured, tried, and convicted during World War II, it carefully
limited its holding to “enemy aliens” during wartime (defined as nationals of the country
with which we are at war), and warned against broadening the holding to foreign nationals
generally. Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 772 (1950). In the Guantánamo detainees
case, Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004), the Court cited Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in
Verdugo-Urquidez and suggested that foreign nationals held at Guantánamo might well be
protected by the Constitution. Id. at 484 n.15. Thus, the question is actually far more
nuanced than Posner’s assertions suggest.
For all his cost-benefit commitments, Posner offers no economic analysis to defend the
proposition that foreign nationals being detained by the United States abroad should be
denied constitutional protections. Their liberty interests are every bit as valid and valuable as
those of a United States citizen who has been detained. And those liberty interests are not in
any way diminished by the fact that they are detained in Guantánamo rather than Atlanta.
Moreover, a foreign national suspected terrorist poses no greater danger to the United States
than a citizen who is a suspected terrorist. Thus, neither the liberty nor the security side of
the equation varies with the passport or location of the detainee. Rather than subject this
question to the balancing he so freely employs in other areas—to find permissible indefinite
preventive detention, coercive interrogation, and nationwide computer surveillance—Posner
simply asserts his conclusions without any real effort to question or analyze them.
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even though in the long term we are likely to suffer as a result, so we know
collectively that in the short term we are likely to empower government to
suppress unpopular speech, invade the privacy of “dangerous” minorities, and
abuse suspected criminals, even though in the long term such actions
undermine the values of free speech, equality, and privacy that are necessary to
democracy and human flourishing. If we were always capable of rationally
assessing the costs and benefits in such a way as to maximize our collective
well-being, short-term and long-term, we might not need a Constitution. But
knowing that societies, like individuals, will be tempted to act in ways that
undermine their own best interests, we have precommitted to a set of
constitutional constraints on pragmatic balancing. Posner’s view that the
Constitution must bend to the point of authorizing virtually any initiative that
seems pragmatic to him reduces the Constitution to a precommitment to
balance costs and benefits, and that is no precommitment at all.
Constitutional theory demands more than ad hoc balancing.27 While the
nature of competing interests means that at some level of generality, a balance
must be struck, constitutional analysis is not an invitation to the freewheeling,
all-things-considered balance of the economist. Instead, it requires an effort,
guided by text, precedent, and history, to identify the higher principles that
guide us as a society, principles so important that they trump democracy itself
(not to mention efficiency). The judge’s constitutional duty was perhaps best
captured by Justice John Marshall Harlan, writing about the due process clause:
Due process has not been reduced to any formula; its content cannot be
determined by reference to any code. The best that can be said is that through
the course of this Court’s decisions it has represented the balance which our
Nation, built upon postulates of respect for the liberty of the individual, has
struck between that liberty and the demands of organized society. If the
supplying of content to this Constitutional concept has of necessity been a
rational process, it certainly has not been one where judges have felt free to
roam where unguided speculation might take them. The balance of which I
speak is the balance struck by this country, having regard to what history
teaches are the traditions from which it developed as well as the traditions
from which it broke. That tradition is a living thing. A decision of this Court
which radically departs from it could not long survive, while a decision which
builds on what has survived is likely to be sound. No formula could serve as a
substitute, in this area, for judgment and restraint.28

Instead of looking to the Constitution and its jurisprudence as a reflection
of our collective effort to determine the higher principles that should guide us,
as Harlan suggests, Posner would start from scratch, assessing what is best
from a pragmatic, open-ended balancing approach that he admits ultimately
involves weighing imponderables.

27. See T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 YALE
L.J. 943, 980-91 & n.231 (1987).
28. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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Posner insists that to declare a practice constitutional is not the same as
saying that it is desirable as a policy matter: “Much that the government is
permitted by the Constitution to do it should not do and can be forbidden to do
by legislation or treaties” (p. 7). That is certainly true as a theoretical matter, at
least where one’s constitutional theory is not reducible to one’s policy
preferences. But Posner appears to view questions of constitutionality as simply
a matter of weighing all the costs and benefits, which is surely the same
utilitarian calculus the policymaker would use to determine whether a practice
is desirable. Under Posner’s approach, then, it is difficult to see why there
would be any room between what is desirable and what is constitutional.
If constitutionalism is to have any bite, it must be distinct from mere policy
preferences. In fact, our Constitution gives judges the authority to declare acts
of democratically elected officials unconstitutional on the understanding that
they will not simply engage in the same cost-benefit analyses that politicians
and economists undertake. The very sources Judge Posner dismisses—text,
precedent, tradition, and reason—as unhelpful in the face of the threat of
catastrophic terrorism are absolutely essential to principled constitutional
decision-making. It is true that text, precedent, tradition, and reason do not
determine results in some mechanistic way. That is why we ask judges, not
machines, to decide constitutional cases. But these sources are nonetheless
critically important constraints on and guides to constitutional decision-making.
They are what identify those principles that have been deemed fundamental—
and therefore constitutional—over our collective history.
The Framers of the Constitution did not simply say “the government may
engage in any practice whose benefits outweigh its costs,” as Judge Posner
would have it. Instead, they struggled to articulate a limited number of
fundamental principles and enshrine them above the everyday pragmatic
judgments of politicians. They foresaw what modern history has shown to be
all too true—that while democracy is an important antidote to tyranny, it can
also facilitate a particular kind of tyranny—the tyranny of the majority.
Constitutional principles protect those who are likely to be the targets of such
tyranny, such as terror suspects, religious and racial minorities, criminal
defendants, enemy combatants, foreign nationals, and, especially in this day
and age, Arabs and Muslims. Relegating such individuals to the mercy of the
legislature denies the existence of that threat. The Constitution is about more
than efficiency and more than democracy; it is a collective commitment to the
equal worth and dignity of all human beings. To fail to see that is to miss the
very point of constitutional law.
Posner’s trump card is that because terrorism in the twenty-first century
poses the risk of truly catastrophic harm, it renders constitutional precedent and
history largely irrelevant. Everything has changed. We are in a new paradigm,
in which, as Alberto Gonzales said of the Geneva Conventions, the old rules
(apparently including even those enshrined in the Constitution) are now
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“quaint” or “obsolete.”29 But each new generation faces unforeseen challenges.
The advent of modern weaponry changed war as we knew it. Communism
backed by the Soviet Union posed a “new” threat of totalitarian takeover. The
development of the nuclear bomb ushered in yet another new era. This is not to
deny that there is a real threat that terrorists may get their hands on weapons of
mass destruction, and that this threat must be taken very seriously. But it is to
insist on what is a truly conservative point—that principles developed and
applied over two centuries still have something important to say in guiding us
as we address the threat of modern terrorism.
The corollary to Posner’s pragmatic and utilitarian balancing approach to
the Constitution is that judges should defer to the political branches on national
security questions. Judges have no special expertise in national security, he
argues, while the political branches do (p. 9). Decisions invalidating security
measures as unconstitutional reduce our flexibility, for they are extremely
difficult to change through the political process, and may cut off avenues of
experimentation (p. 27). But the Constitution was meant to cut off certain
avenues. Trying suspected terrorists without a jury, locking them up without
access to a judge, convicting them without proving guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt, searching them without probable cause or a warrant, and subjecting
them to torture all might make terrorists’ tasks more difficult (although, as I
have argued elsewhere, many of these shortcuts actually help the terrorists and
make us more vulnerable, because of the backlash they provoke).30 But while
the Constitution may not be a “suicide pact,” neither is it a license to do
anything our leaders think might improve our safety.
Posner himself recognizes one reason why deference to the political
branches is ultimately inadequate. As he puts it, “people whose profession is to
protect national security are unlikely to give a great deal of weight to civil
liberties unless required to do so by some outside force, such as the judiciary”
(p. 61). Justice Souter made a similar point in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, writing that:
In a government of separated powers, deciding finally on what is a reasonable
degree of guaranteed liberty whether in peace or war (or some condition in
between) is not well entrusted to the Executive Branch of Government, whose
particular responsibility is to maintain security. For reasons of inescapable
human nature, the branch of the Government asked to counter a serious threat
is not the branch on which to rest the Nation’s entire reliance in striking the
balance between the will to win and the cost in liberty on the way to victory;
the responsibility for security will naturally amplify the claim that security
legitimately raises.31

29. Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President, Memorandum for the President,
Decision Re Application of the Geneva Convention on Prisoners of War to the Conflict with
Al Qaeda and the Taliban (Jan. 25, 2002), available at http://msnbc.com/modules/
newsweek/pdf/gonzales_memo.pdf.
30. See David Cole, Are We Safer?, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Mar. 9, 2006, at 15.
31. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 545 (2004) (Souter, J., concurring).
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The political dynamics of fear in a democracy provide yet another
fundamental reason for not deferring to the political branches. The majority
typically targets a vulnerable minority for the sacrifices in liberty it decides
should be borne to further its security interests. Because the majority, and the
representatives who answer to it, are balancing the majority’s security interests
against the liberty interests of a select (and typically unpopular) minority, the
political process is especially unlikely to get the balance right, whatever that
means.
But while Posner acknowledges the danger of relying on executive officials
to balance liberty and security, he ultimately argues for substantial deference to
the political branches, both because he thinks judges lack expertise in national
security matters, and because he insists that the Constitution should allow the
government the flexibility to respond to terrorist threats.
In defense of judicial deference to the political branches, Posner reassures
his readers, “the Republican Congress has not been a rubber stamp for the
national security initiatives of the Bush administration” (p. 10). The record
suggests otherwise. Since 9/11, Congress has largely stood quiescently by in
the face of sweeping assertions of executive power, and when it has intervened,
it has either given the executive branch more power or enacted toothless
symbolic measures that pose no real obstacle to the Administration. Thus,
Congress took no action when the President claimed the power to lock up U.S.
citizens indefinitely without charges or trial as “enemy combatants”; it took the
Supreme Court to step in and demand due process. Shortly after 9/11, Congress
passed the Patriot Act, giving the executive broad new powers and reducing
judicial oversight; in doing so, it imposed only a few minor modifications on
the administration’s initial proposal.32 Of course, the Patriot Act might be
excused by the intense heat of the moment—but four years later, with all the
time in the world for deliberation, Congress calmly reauthorized the Patriot Act
virtually unchanged, as many of its surveillance provisions were set to expire.
In 2006, Congress did stand up to the President on the imposition of cruel,
inhuman, and degrading treatment on foreign nationals held abroad, passing the
McCain Amendment with overwhelming majorities. But that law included no
mechanism for enforcement of violations, and expressly barred prisoners in the
war on terror from filing habeas corpus petitions to challenge such abuse.
If there was any doubt about the general unwillingness of Congress to
check the President on matters of national security and civil liberties,
particularly when it comes to the liberties of foreign nationals, that doubt was
resolved by Congress’s response to the Supreme Court’s decision in Hamdan v.
Rumsfeld.33 In Hamdan, the Court declared the President’s military tribunal

32. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115
Stat. 272 (codified in scattered titles of U.S.C.).
33. 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006).
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rules to be in violation of both federal statute and the Geneva Conventions. As
nearly its last act, the Republican Congress in 2006 enacted the Military
Commissions Act (MCA).34 Again, some Republicans—especially Senators
John McCain and Lindsay Graham—made a show of standing up to the
Administration, but ultimately capitulated, giving the Administration almost
everything it wanted. The new law permits the President to try foreign nationals
as enemy combatants before military tribunals that may consider coerced
testimony, hearsay, and summaries of classified information that the defendant
will have no real opportunity to confront. Instead of requiring the President to
conform his tribunals to the Geneva Conventions, Congress simply declared, as
if saying it makes it so, that the procedures it authorized fully satisfy the
Geneva Conventions. Just to make sure, Congress insulated its action from
judicial review by barring anyone from invoking the Geneva Conventions
against a federal official or the United States government.
The MCA also weakens the prohibitions on coercive interrogation of war
prisoners. Before enactment of the MCA, the federal War Crimes Act made any
violation of Common Article 3 a criminal offense, including any “cruel
treatment” of a detainee. The MCA amended the War Crimes Act to limit its
reach to specified “grave breaches,” notably not including all “cruel
treatment.”35 The MCA limits criminal sanctions to those who torture prisoners
of war or inflict suffering virtually identical to that associated with torture.
Taking a page from John Yoo and Richard Posner, Congress narrowly defined
“war crimes” in order to free up the CIA to resume its practice of disappearing
suspected terrorists into undisclosed “black sites” and subjecting them to harsh
interrogation tactics.
Finally, the MCA seeks to remove courts from the picture. In addition to
barring prisoners from invoking the Geneva Conventions in court, the law
eliminates habeas corpus jurisdiction for those held as “unlawful enemy
combatants,”36 a term defined in circular terms as anyone found to be an
unlawful enemy combatant by a “competent tribunal” established by the
President, without regard to objective criteria. Such persons are relegated to
limited judicial review in the D.C. Circuit—review that cannot consider claims
that they are being tortured or otherwise abused, and that may not be able to
engage in any factual inquiry into whether the individuals before it were in fact
fighting for the enemy.37

34. Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600.
35. Id. § 6.
36. Id. § 950j(b).
37. In February, the D.C. Circuit held that the MCA had indeed eliminated habeas
corpus jurisdiction for enemy combatants held at Guantánamo, and further held that this
poses no constitutional problem because foreign nationals held outside our borders—even in
areas over which we exercise complete jurisdiction and control, such as Guantánamo—have
no right to habeas corpus review even when they are being indefinitely detained by United
States authorities. Boumediene v. Bush, 476 F.3d 981 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
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The historical record on legislative checks is no better. Congress, after all,
passed the Alien and Sedition Acts, the World War I statutes that made it a
crime to speak out against the war, and the anti-communist laws that laid the
groundwork for the McCarthy era. Congress took no action to block President
Roosevelt’s internment of the Japanese during World War II. In fact, one is
hard-pressed to identify a single instance in which the Congress has imposed a
significant constraint on the President during a national security crisis.
CONCLUSION
In short, deference to the political branches is not the answer; that is why
we have a Constitution. Posner’s approach ensures that the Constitution is “not
a suicide pact,” but only by making it not a “pact” at all. Properly understood,
the Constitution signifies a commitment to principle over pragmatism, and in
particular to principles such as liberty, equality, and dignity, which cannot
easily be balanced away. It is precisely because the political branches are so
quick to forget that, especially when fear is high and the rights (and here, lives)
of nonconstituents are on the line, that we must insist on a Constitution of
principle, enforced by judges who eschew the easy road of deference and the
subjective method of open-ended balancing for the hard road of standing up for
principle against power.
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